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Introduction
In New Zealand organic farming is a burgeoning sector of the
rural economy. Certified organic production units may have
their products guaranteed by a range of systems. These systems
generallyrely upon organic production standards the standards
and an external review in terms of adherence to the standards.
Failure to comply with the rules results both in a loss of integrity
and if detected, decertification.
As New Zealand farming systems generally operate in an
open environment, one of the more likely threats to integrity
arises when a non-organic activity produces externalities
which impact negatively on an organic farm. Chemical
drift and pollution by genetically modified organisms
GMO are two of the more serious threats to organic farms.
Contamination of an organic farm by agrichemicals results
when a chemical application travels off-target. Off-target
effects can occur by the chemical travelling through the air,
through the ground and soil, and by water. In New Zealand the
majority of all documented events occurred via air,2 although
contamination by water has received attention in the Privy
Council.3 Widespread contamination from non-point sources
is increasingly being recognised as a source of pollution.
Incursion by GMO is a more recent threat. Under current
organic certification systems, latitude in terms of background
contamination by GMOs is not entertained. Genetically
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engineered varieties and seeds are expressly prohibited, and
as such, any contamination will result in decertification of
product and/or land.
The author has considered the general protection of organic
farms in detail elsewhere. The purpose of this article is to
specifically consider common law remedies for loss suffered
consequent upon an external event which causes damage to the
integrity of an organic farm.
Common law loss
The common law has traditionally been the mechanism used
by property owners to restrain others from causing harm to
property and to recover for loss suffered. The common law
takes effect in different ways. It employs the equitable remedy
of injunction to stop or prevent harm occurring and makes
provision for damages to compensate for loss suffered. The
existence of remedies at common law may also act as a deterrent
to unlawful actions. The threat of a suit can result in changes in
property use, whereby a neighbouring owner takes care to order
activities to prevent damage to another. In this way liability may
operate as a pricing mechanism resulting in the internalisation
of adverse effects.
The value of common law remedies to the organic farmer
will be assessed. One of the enquiries will be, whether these
traditional remedies that experienced infancy in the Industrial
Revolution,3 are capable of providing meaningful solutions in the
face of the changed world of the 21st century.
Common law loss caused to an organic farm by all external
threats can be categorised as follows:
i Property damage, such as damage to plants or pesticide
residues due to chemical drift, or GMO contamination of land,
crop, processed foods and other products.6
2 Economic loss consequent upon decertification due to
contamination.
3 General environmental damage, for instance loss of
biodiversity.7
173
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT THEORY & PRACTICE 2010
Recovery for such loss sounds potentially in negligence and
nuisance. A review of these remedies indicates that some forms
of loss will be more readily recoverable by the organic farmer
than others and exposes the vulnerable position currently
occupied by the organic farm. In particular, issues related to
economic loss, sensitivity, foreseeability and statutory authority
present problems that need to be addressed before recovery can
be secured.
The use of common law remedies in response to threats
from contamination by agrichemicals and GMOs has been the
subject of several publications.8 These works provide a basis
for enquiry and exploration of remedies particular to the
organic farm. However, the author's widespread search for
judicial consideration of the issues as they relate specifically
to organic farms indicates that such consideration is sparse. In
New Zealand the authorities do not pertain expressly to organic
farms,9 whilst in the United States, the leading case was decided
over 25 years ago.'° The Australian decisions tend to consider
organic farms as the issues arise in the planning context, and any
decisions located by searching United Kingdom databases tend
to discuss issues peripherally.11 The Canadian determinations
emanating from the Hoffman v Monsanto12 litigation provide the
most detailed consideration of common law remedies for loss
suffered by organic farmers by virtue of GMO contamination, yet
the relevance of that litigation is constrained by limiting factors
related to proximity and policy reasons linked with government
approval. Given the expansion of organic farming and the
concomitant rise of technology which threatens the integrity
of organic farming, it is timely to give detailed consideration to
recovery for loss suffered.
Liability for damage caused by chemical drift
Negligence
The organic farmer stands in the same shoes as any farmer in
respect of recovery for property damage caused by chemical
drift. Negligence has been the main ground for recovery in such
a situation, although there is also potential for claims based on
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strict liability and nuisance.13 To establish negligence a plaintiff
must show:14
i The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care that is, the
risk of the damage was foreseeable;
2 The defendant has breached that duty;
3 The breach of the duty caused the loss to the plaintiff; and
4 The loss suffered was not too remote.
Recovery for damage caused to property by chemical drift has
been viewed as difficult because of the need to establish causation.
Commonly drift that occurs is invisible, and unless the event is
witnessed and documented there may be insufficient proof of
cause and effect. However, improved scientific testing procedures
have been developed and are more freely available. In establishing
a duty of care, a judge will look to the accumulated experience of
past courts. Where proof of causation is available, New Zealand
courts have not found any difficulty in establishing a duty of care
in terms of application of toxic sprays and have recognised the
risks attached to such practices.15 In a novel or borderline case,
the courts tend to apply a two stage approach: first by examining
the relationship between the parties, in terms of foreseeability
and proximity and then weighing up policy reasons or broader
implications for the community in recognising or denying a duty.'6
The nature ofthe damage
In relation to chemical drift, a particular problem exists for the
organic farmer. Not all chemical drift will necessarily create
physical damage so as to render the produce unable to be
consumed or sold. Maximum pesticide residues levels MRL'7 exist
for food safety reasons and apply to all produce. If pesticide drift
occurs on a non-organic farm, yet does not exceed this MRL the
general standard then arguably the owner ofthe property has not
suffered damage. The position is not the same for an organic farm.
Generally the acceptable level for an organic farm will be set at 10
per cent of the MRL.18 The question arises as to whether or not the
property is physically damaged by the presence of a contaminant
at levels lower than those tolerated by general society.
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From an organic farmer's point ofviewthe property is damaged
at any level in excess of the 10 per cent threshold, as the property
is rendered unsuitable for organic certification. The first enquiry
in this situation is whether physical damage to the property
has occurred. The common law establishes that when property
is physically changed then it is damaged, but classification is
not always straightforward.19 Where a defendant sprayed with
insecticide, crops which were then consumed by cattle so as to
create inert chemical residues in the fat of the cattle, the Court
found that the plaintiffhad suffered economic loss resulting from
the damage to the cattle. Due to the presence of the chemical
[which did not harm the cattle any costs from postponement of
sale, reduction of price or other associated expenses suffered by
the plaintiff could be recovered.20 Although it is currently unclear
how a court will view similar loss suffered by an organic farmer
it is possible that where an organic farmer suffers damage to a
crop which causes prohibited residues in excess of the relevant
organic standard, but less than the general standard, any claim
should be for pure economic loss, as opposed to physical damage.
This is arguable and will depend on the extent of the damage, and
the view taken by the court of the damage. However, proceeding
on the basis that decertification may constitute economic loss,
recovery for that loss will now be considered.
Economic loss
Decertification of an organic farm consequent upon a breach of
standards may create financial loss due to loss of sales, forward
contracts and premium. Rejection of general non-organic
export crops due to excess chemical residues creates similar
losses. Recovery may be sought in addition to loss caused by
physical damage, or in substitution for it if physical damage is
not proved. Damages for loss of profits may also be sought.
Due to policy considerations, relating generally to constraining
indeterminate claims,21 the courts have been cautious ofimposing
a duty of care where a person suffers pure economic loss that
is not the result of injury to person or tangible property.22 The
law relating to recovery for economic loss is relatively new,
and different approaches have been advanced for dealing with
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situations where there is no legal precedent.23 In New Zealand
there is currently no formulaic approach, beyond general
principle, and financial loss is recoverable as a matter of ordinary
principle where policy considerations point to that concIusion.2
Recovery is potentially available for both consequential and
relational loss.
The High Court of Australia considered the impact of
decertification25 in Perre vApand Pty Ltd.26 Although since the date
of this decision the High Court27 has restated the law in relation to
the significance of the concept of proximity in novel cases, many
of the salient factors identified in the case continue to impact
upon the establishment of a duty of care and the determination
of liability.28 In Perre v Apand Pty Ltd the respondent was a major
operator in the potato crisping industry in South Australia
and provided potato seed to a number of growers throughout
Australia. The seed produced a crop suffering from the disease
known as bacterial wilt. Affected growers included the Sparnons.
The appellants were all potato growers who conducted their
business in close proximity to the affected Sparnon property,
as a consequence of which their crops were denied certification
due to the risk of infection. Absence of certification resulted in
inability to access the Western Australian market. None of the
appellants' properties suffered physical harm as a result of the
presence of the affected crop. The appellants did, however, suffer
significant financial loss due to the loss of market.29
The High Court of Australia allowed the appellants' claims
to succeed. In doing so, they returned to general principle to
support the claims. As stated by McHugh J:3°
In determining whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff, the ultimate issue is always whether the defendant in
pursuing a course of conduct that caused injury to the plaintiff, or
failing to pursue a course of conduct which would have prevented
injury to the plaintiff, should have had the interest or interests of
the plaintiff in contemplation before he or she pursued or failed
to pursue that course of conduct31 That issue applies whether the
damage suffered is injury to person or tangible property or pure
economic loss.32
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In connection with the existence of a duty of care the Justices
considered proximity and vulnerability. The fact that the
appellants were near neighbours either adjoining or in the
locale was relevant and affected the duty of care. Additionally
the respondent's knowledge of the neighbouring potato growers'
vulnerability to the disease, and inability to control it was
relevant.33 As summarised by Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J:
Furthermore, the combination of circumstances involving the use
and ownership or enjoyment of land, the physical propinquity of
such land to the Sparnons' land, the known vulnerability of people
in the position of the appellants, and the control exercised by the
respondent over the relevant activity on the Sparnons' land, is
unlikely to apply to an extent sufficient to warrant an apprehension
of indeterminate liability.
Where a person is in a position to control the exercise or enjoyment
by another of a legal right, that position of control and, by corollary,
the other's dependence on the person with control are, in my view,
special factors or, which is the same thing, give rise to a special
relationship of"proximity" or "neighbourhood" such thatthe law will
impose liability upon the person with control if his or her negligent
act or omission results in the loss or impairment of that right and is,
thereby, productive of economic loss.
In my view, where a person knows or ought to know that his or her
acts or omissions may cause the loss or impairment of legal rights
possessed, enjoyed or exercised by another, whether as an individual
or as a member of a class, and that that latter person is in no position
to protect his or her own interests, there is a relationship such that
the law should impose a duty of care on the former to take reasonable
steps to avoid a foreseeable risk of economic loss resulting from the
loss or impairment of those rights.
Although the Justices applied different approaches, the various
decisions considered the establishment of a duty and then moved
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to issues of policy which could act to negate any duty.3 Kirby
j weighed two policy reasons that in the past have emerged tojustify a rule excluding a legal duty of care to a plaintiff who hassuffered no physical damage to its person or property, but only
pure economic loss.5 The first related to indeterminacy and was
eliminated on the grounds of ability to ascertain. The second
reason was whether to hold the respondent to a legal duty of care
would be to unreasonably interfere with its economic freedom,
its autonomy and the competitive operation of the marketplace.6
In considering this issue Kirby J took into account the fact that
the introduction of infected seed to South Australia was illegal,
and as such refused to find a good policy reason for excluding the
duty. His Honour did not decide whether, absent such statutory
prohibitions, illegality otherwise affecting what Apand did in
relation to the Perre interests would have been sufficient in any
case to put a limit on Apand's economic freedoni. The interface
with statute and statutory regulations, and the defendant's
conduct in relation to them, therefore becomes relevant.
In New Zealand it is well established that statute law will abrogate
common law rights where there is inconsistency.8 Following a
similar line, where the law of negligence develops, courts tend to
seek consistency with statutes and other legal principles.39 It could
be argued that where statute law does not restrict a defendant's
freedom, then the common law should be slow to impose any
limitation. Yet this tends to overlook the plaintiff's freedom to
operate within the market, and also any particular exposure or
vulnerability a plaintiff may have in relation to its relationship
with the defendant. It is accepted that in our free enterprise society
competition in the marketplace will only be restricted on a limited
basis.4° However, in essence this line of policy relates to choice,
and the freedom of an individual to exercise that choice without
unnecessary limitations. As stated by Mc Hugh J:4'
One of the central tenets of the common law is that a person is
legally responsible for his or her choices. It is a corollary of that
responsibility that a person is entitled to make those choices for
him or her self without unjustifiable interference from others. In
other words, the common law regards individuals as autonomous
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beings entitled to make, but responsible for, their own Choices .,, In
any organised society, however, individuals cannot have complete
autonomy, for the good government of a society is impossible
unless the sovereign power in that society has power in various
circumstances to coerce the citizen. Nevertheless, the common law
has generally sought to interfere with the autonomy of individuals
only to the extent necessary for the maintenance of society.
McHugh I refers to unjustifiable interference.When placing this
notion in the context of a land use conflict, it takes on a similar
aspect to a claim in nuisance for unreasonable interference with
the use and enjoyment ofland. Where the interference constitutes
an intrusion onto another's land, consideration of fundamental
property rights may assist in defining further evolution of policy
in this context. The right to exclude, and/or gain compensation for
use is apposite. Should it be the defendant's freedom to operate
in the market or the plaintiff's right to choose how land owned
is managed which is paramount? In considering these issues, a
final relevant factor is the steps taken by the plaintiff to protect
itselffrom harm. As noted by McHugh J,42 where it was reasonably
open to the plaintiff to take steps to protect itself, then this may
remove reason for imposing a duty of care. The protective steps
contemplated are generally in the form of contractual warranties,
but do not normally include a requirement to obtain insurance to
cover the loss.43 A plaintiff's vulnerability is more likely to arise
where it is unable to protect itself by contract.44
New Zealand courts have applied the concept of vulnerability
in relation to liability in tort. In Rolls-Royce New Zealand Ltd v
Carter Holt Harvey Ltd, the Court of Appeal, in assessing issues of
proximity in negligence, accepted that "the extent to which those in
the plaintiff's position are vulnerable can also be taken into account".
The Court referred to the High Court of Australia in Woolcock Street
Investments Pty Ltd v CDG PtyLtd46 which, in following Perre vApand,
found that vulnerability is a key factor in determining liability47
Application to organicfarms
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd is useful to organic farmers to the extent
that it allows for recovery for economic loss consequent upon
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decertification. In terms of application to New Zealand law,
decisions of the High Court of Australia are regarded as highly
persuasive. The factual circumstances of the case are slightly
different in that none of the appellants suffered any form of
physical damage. It was simply their presence in the locale that
led to decertification. For decertification to occur on an organic
farm, in relation to chemical contamination, there will be some
residual presence or damage from a chemical. Nevertheless, in
either circumstance decertification is the consequence.
The issue of damage requires further consideration.
Traditionally tort has provided a remedy where a defendant gains
by expropriating a resource that a plaintiff has an exclusive right
to use.8 A question to consider is to what extent does the damage
represent an interference with a property right exclusive to the
plaintiff? Does the presence ofthe residue impact upon the plaintiff
and confer a benefit upon the defendant in a manner that is unfair
in the circumstances? To what extent does a property right support
a claim for zero tolerance? Should the degree of expropriation in
an instance of decertification found a right to compensation?
In resolving these issues a court will examine the position of the
non-organic farmer. It will need to weigh the steps taken to avoid
harm, the gravity of the risk, the ease of avoidance and the social
value of the activity.49 In this way locality, topography, proximity,
land use, type of vegetation and crop, physical and natural barriers,
chemicals and methods of application require consideration in
determining the existence of a duty of care. Exclusionary factors
also require consideration, but a court will need to balance the
economic freedom ofthe defendant against the right ofthe plaintiff
to exclude others from property owned. Efficient allocation in a
well-functioning market economy turns upon the characteristic
of exclusivity.50 By contaminating the property of the organic
farm, the non-organic grower stifles the freedom of the organic
farmer to choose how to farm and how to create an economic gain.
A policy choice to disallow recovery for economic loss in these
circumstances also fails to incorporate the principle of polluter
pays to a full extent. Evolving policy in a direction away from the
concept of polluter pays is arguably out of step with domestic and
international developments in environmental law.
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In relation to establishing a duty of care considerations ofknown
vulnerabilityand proximity; are key factors. Any neighbourwho has
received notice of presence from an organic farmer will be aware
of the farm's vulnerability to prohibited inputs. That neighbour
will not normally be in a contractual relationship with the organic
farmer and as such protection via contract is unavailable. Should
knowledge of the vulnerability and awareness of appreciable
harm give rise to a duty of care? The Court in Perre v Apand Pty
Ltd said yes. What is unclear however, is whether a spray operator,
guilty of causing residues which offend organic standards, but
not the general standard, should for policy reasons be excluded
from owing a duty of care. It is feasible that the existence of a
statutory scheme that expresses tolerances by way of MRLs,51
or any other tolerance standard, could affect the way in which a
court applies the doctrine of negligence. A court may choose to
promote consistency with statute and thus align the common law
with statute. However it is unlikely that a court would adopt this
course where it would cut across other statutory schemes, such
as the Resource Management Act 1991 RMA, under which more
stringent controls on the use of hazardous substances may be
imposed. In particular the provisions of a regional plan would
require scrutiny to assess the legality of any discharge activity. A
regional plan directed at controlling chemical drift by avoidance,
tied to a rule requiring the preparation of a spray plan identifying
sensitive activities potentially removes the barriers of legality
and foreseeability and could establish known vulnerability. The
framing of a regional plan thus acquires real importance in terms
of recovery by an organic farmer for economic loss at common
law.
Recovery by the organic farmer for economic loss is not
assured and will depend upon the facts of a given case. There
is, however, potential for considerations of known vulnerability
and awareness of appreciable harm, to override other policy
considerations. The critical issue is establishing known
vulnerability and avoidability. Notice of organic status thereby
assumes considerable importance. The existence of known
vulnerability may also be a ground for defeating exclusion from




Upon establishment of the category of damage the second
enquiry relates to the sensitivity of the plaintiff. If chemical
contamination causes damage in excess of the general threshold
then an organic farmer is in the same position as a non-organic
farmer and is unlikely to be deemed sensitive. Where however a
certification system of any kind sets a threshold higher than the
general standard there is potential to be deemed sensitive, where
recovery is sought for loss in excess of the general standard. If
organic farming systems are deemed sensitive, there is a body of
law that suggests that recovery in negligence and nuisance should
not be permitted, as it is incumbent upon the sensitive activity to
protect itself from harm. The question of sensitivity also affects
foreseeabilit and hence the extent of the duty of care.
Hamilton v Papakura District Council,52 a decision of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council deals with the issue of sensitivity.
This decision represents a significant but not insurmountable
obstacle to activities deemed sensitive. The plaintiffs in this
case were not organic growers, but grew cherry tomatoes
hydroponically at three properties in Papakura. At two of the
properties the water for the hydroponic system was drawn from
the town supply, operated by Papakura District Council, and
sourced from bulk supplier Watercare Services Ltd. The plaintiffs
alleged that the water supplied was contaminated with herbicide
levels that were toxic to their plants. The plaintiffs based their
case in contract Sale of Goods Act 1908 and tort negligence
nuisance and Rylands v Fletcher.
The difficulty faced by the plaintiffs was that ifthe water supply
did cause the damage to the plants which the Court accepted
as probable, it was because the tomato plants must have been
sensitive and vulnerable to herbicides at very low levels in their
particular growing conditions. The chemical in question was
triclopyr, and it was suggested that the plants were sensitive to
the chemical in the range of 1 to 10 ppb.53 It was acknowledged
that triclopyr atlo ppb was one-tenth of the maximum allowable
level under the 1995 drinking water standard and, if detected,
would not precipitate any monitoring on health grounds.54
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The Privy Council upheld the Court of Appeal and dismissed
the claim in negligence. The first ground for dismissing the claim
was that it was unreasonable to extend the duty of care to all
uses, particularly where those uses may have special needs. The
Court found:55
If the duty is put in terms of all uses, even all uses known to Papakura,
the duty would be extraordinarily broad. For a Court to impose
such a duty would be to impose a requirement on water suppliers
which goes far beyond the duty met in practice by those authorities
supplying bulk water, a duty which has long been founded on the
drinking water standards, standards drawn from World Health
Organisation guidelines and from other international material and
established through extensive consultation. It would impose extras
costs on general users which relate in no way to their needs for pure,
potable water. No evidence was called to support the imposition of
such a wide-ranging, costly and burdensome duty.
This finding would suggest that where a defendant in its
activities achieved a minimum standard defined by general law,
then a duty of care in negligence would not extend to a more
restrictive standard. The Privy Council approved the view of
Gault J who said:56
Those who have particular requirements, and in this case it was a
particular requirement over and above water of ordinary standards,
must deal with the problem as part of their ordinary operating
procedure.
The Court ofAppeal concluded that to require a water supplier
to ensure that the town water supply had a zero level of triclopyr
contamination would be unrealistic in this country with its
agricultural based economy.57
Distinguishingfeatures
Hamilton v Papakura District Council relates to water supply for a
public purpose. Actionable negligence involves an explicit overall
weighing of the costs and benefits generated by the defendant's
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activities.8 The policy evident behind the decision is avoidanceof the imposition of undue cost upon water suppliers that thenflows onto general users. The difficulties faced by a watersupplier in avoiding widespread contamination by chemicals ofwater catchments are no doubt factored into the reasoning. TheCourt places the burden on the sensitive user to employ measures
that protect from this risk.
In relation to a conflict between organic and non-organic
farmers it is arguable whether the reasoning in Hamilton v
Papakura District Council can be extended to apply to point
source chemical drift. In the latter situation there is no question
of supply to the public, and the issue of indeterminacy does
not arise. A non-organic farmer is in a much better position to
internalise the adverse effects of chemical drift, than is a water
supplier whose catchment area may have a broad reach.
A second point for consideration is the justification for
extending policy so as to treat an entire sector as sensitive. The
concept of sensitivity may require reshaping in the face of the
21st century. The growth of the organic sector, environmental
benefits produced and the concomitant public support may
influence such policy. Cognisance of mounting environmental
pressures derived from agriculture and of international
measures to actively support organic farming so as to reduce
that pressure may have bearing. It may also be helpful to
reconsider underlying property rights in this instance. If organic
farming is deemed a sensitive activity, an organic farmer's
right to exclude others from property owned is diminished. It
is arguable that diminution of that fundamental right by reason
of sensitivity alone, without recognition of known vulnerability
and avoidability, is inequitable.
Property rights evolve and change in response to economic,
social and environmental pressures.59 Regarding organic farmers
as sensitive gives primacy to the right of non-organic farmers to
pollute on grounds of economic and consequent social benefits. It
would, however, completely fail to respond to the economic and
social needs of the organic farmer or arguably the need of the
wider environment. It can be argued that such policy infringes
the right to be free from environmental harm, as well as failing to
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provide for future generations. Terming organic farmers sensitive
may also be out of step with rules in resource management plans
made under the RMA. Statutory directions to promote sustainable
management and to consider the sensitivity of the receiving
environment may create conditions where vulnerable activities
require protection. There is much at stake in consequence of
treating an organic farm a sensitive activity; and a court well
apprised of these issues may be reluctant so to do.
Foreseeability
The second ground in Hamilton v Papakura District Council for
dismissing the claim in negligence related to the inability of
the plaintiff to show that the loss was foreseeable. Sir Kenneth
Keith6° for the Judicial Committee held:61
The extraordinarily broad scope of the proposed duty provides
one decisive reason for rejecting the claims in negligence. A second,
distinct reason is provided by the requirement of foreseeability. The
High Court in the passage quoted and endorsed by the Court ofAppeal
see para [31] above said that in the circumstances it was unable to
conclude that it was or should have been reasonably foreseeable to
Watercare, still less to Papakura, that water containing herbicides
at a fraction of the concentration allowable for human consumption
would cause damage to cherry tomatoes grown hydroponically
As the Board made clear in Overseas Tankship UK Ltd v Miller
Steamship Co Pty The Wagon Mound No 2 [1967] AC 617 at p 643,
damage is foreseeable only when there is a real risk of damage, that
is one which would occur to the mind of a reasonable person in the
position of the defendant and one which he would not brush aside as
far-fetched. The mere fact that certain herbicides may kill or damage
certain plants at certain concentrations does not itself establish
such a risk.
The Court found that lack of reasonable foreseeabilitywas firmly




The finding on this point is related directed to the susceptibility ofthe tomato plant to certain herbicides, a fact of which none of theparties not even the plaintiffs] had knowledge. The position fororganic farmers can be differentiated in that notice of organic statuscan readily be given to neighbours and contractors. In fact in manysituations this will be a requirement62 Possession of knowledge
would affect foreseeability of harm, particularly if notice givenwere comprehensive. The giving of notice is also critical on the
basis that it may ground liability in negligence if a defendant, with
knowledge of the plaintiff's special susceptibi1it fails to adopt
such reasonable precautions as would have avoided the damage
without appreciable prejudice to his or her own interests.6
The scope of appreciable prejudice inthe contextofrestrictions
on the spraying practices of a farmer is unclear. However, given
the techniques available to limit spray contamination of other
properties, it is arguable that this could be achieved with minor
consequences to the, non-organic farmer comparative to the
harm caused to the organic farmer. The question to return to is,
is there a real risk of damage, and is it reasonable, fair and just to
recover the damage suffered? Most reasonable people apprised
of the existence of an organic farm on their boundaries would
appreciate the risk of causing physical or economic damage to
their neighbour by the use of uncontrolled chemical application.
The organic sector, in allowing for contamination of up to 10 per
cent of MRLs, also recognises the reality of background levels
of pollution. What is yet to be decided is whether or not it is
reasonable for organic farmers to recover for loss caused above
that background level but below the general 1evel.6
To disallow recovery on the basis of susceptibility, places,
organic farming firmly in the hypersensitive category. Perhaps
it is the reality of the modern world that attempting to farm
naturally has become unnatural or abnormal. This is a somewhat
troubling reflection of the way in which we order this world, and
it would also appear to be out of step with international and
national policies geared to reducing the externalities of modern
agriculture. If the common law fails to provide for organic
farms to recover damages for economic loss consequent upon
187
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT THEORY & PRACTICE 2010
decertification, where there was no physical damage, it leaves
organic farming with the following choices:
1 Reliance on the general law, for instance the RMA.
2 Risking contamination for which no recovery will be allowed.
3 Grouping with like activities and creating spatial barriers.
4 Erecting physical barriers.
5 Accepting MRLs as standards thus diluting if not eliminating
the organic standard.
Nuisance
Nuisance is the customary common law remedy employed
to resolve land use conflicts.6 A plaintiff suffering damage
to property or interference with the enjoyment of land,
without physical damage, may make a claim in nuisance.66 An
encroachment on to land so as to closely resemble trespass
may also constitute a private nuisance.6 Fleming describes the
inherent difficulties in the resolution of land use conflict:68
The paramount problem in the law of nuisance is therefore to strike a
tolerable balance between conflicting claims of neighbours, each invoking
the privilege to exploit the resources and enjoythe amenities ofhis property
without undue subordination to the reciprocal interests of the other.
In nuisance, liability may be easier to prove than negligence.
Once damage to property or loss of enjoyment of a naturally
occurring right is proven, the defendant must then raise a defence,
for instance that he or she was using reasonable skill and care
in the ordinary or natural use of land. The focus will be upon
whether or not the defendant's interference was unreasonable
in the circumstances, rather than upon whether or not adequate
precautions were taken.6 Fleming discusses the factors to be
considered in striking the balance between the conflicting claims
by reference to the standard of reasonableness:
In striking this balance, a number of factors are given weight in
accordance with traditional values relating to private property
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rights. Little, if any, attention is paid directly to utilitarian criteria
like cost or resource efficiency or to the larger considerations of
zoning and welfare, which are thought to belong to the province of
legislation and planning.
Due to the range of interests incidental to ownership, nuisance
liability offers protection against a wide range of harms. The
character and duration of harm will determine the existence of
an unreasonable interference. The immediate neighbourhood
will form the background against which the standard of
reasonableness will be assessed.7° In Hawkes Bay Protein Ltd v
Davidson,71 Gendall I observed:
The law requires the standard of comfort and convenience of
the average man within the character of the neighbourhood to be
taken into account. It is well known if someone lives in an industrial
town they cannot reasonably expect the same purity of air or
freedom from noise as in a pleasant country locality, or exclusively
residential district. But this does not mean that someone who lives
in a noisy neighbourhood can never complain of additional noise,
any more than someone who occupies an industrial neighbourhood
cannot complain of additional excessive industrial disturbances
or, in the present case, excessive odours. It is a question of degree
and assessment of the extent to which the increased volume of
noxious smells, judged by the standards prevailing in that area, is so
substantial as to detract from the standard of comfort reasonably to
be expected of an occupier of neighbouring property.
The conduct of the wrongdoer need not necessarily be
unlawful,72 and compliance with planning permission does not
operate as a defence to a claim in nuisance.73 Such an approach
has parallels to the operation of s 17 of the RMA, which may
override lawful activities where an adverse effect upon the
environment is evident.74 It is no defence for the defendant
to show that the activity carried out confers a benefit on the
public that outweighs the harm done to the plaintiff.75 Fleming
notes that some consideration will be given to the fact that the
offensive operation is essential and unavoidable in a particular
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locality, but warns that the argument should not be pushed too
far:6
it should be remembered that we are concerned with reciprocal
rights and duties of private individuals, and a defendant cannot
simply justify his infliction of greatharm upon the plaintiff by urging
a greater benefit to the public at large has accrued from his conduct.
Fleming reminds us that "where the public be interested let the
public bear the loss", a result that he says can be accomplished
by holding the defendant liable in the first place and letting
him charge the cost to the benefiting public or alternatively
conferring statutory authorisation on the enterprise coupled
with compensation for damage caused. This approach is
consistent with a requirement for internalisation of effects.
In nuisance the focus remains trained upon what is reasonable
in the circumstances. It is no defence that the plaintiff came to
the nuisance.77 In this way the common law diminishes a first in
time first in right argument. Todd identifies the policy reason
for taking the position as "[o]therwise one occupier would be
able, by establishing his use first, to permanently diminish the
value of neighbouring land without providing compensation".8
Furthermore, in nuisance it is irrelevant that the plaintiff failed
to take steps to avoid or minimise the harm,79 as the focus of the
enquiry rests upon the interference. In Bank of New Zealand v
Greenwood ° it was held that liability in nuisance arose even
in circumstances where a plaintiff could avoid the effects more
cheaply than the defendant could eliminate the nuisance, unless
the cost of elimination was so proportionately small, so as to
lead the court to a conclusion that no actionable nuisance had
occurred.
Foreseeability of harm is a requirement and the plaintiff may
fail if the activity they undertake is unduly sensitive.81 In relation
to sensitivity, Gendall J in Hawkes Bay Protein v Davidson Ltdheld:B2
The discomfort must be substantial, not merely with reference
to a plaintiff and his/her sensitivities but to a degree that would
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be substantial to any person occupying the plaintiff's premises
irrespective of age or State of health. Itmustbe that which materially
interferes with the ordinary comfort expected of occupation in
the relevant area according to the reasonable standards expected
amongst those in that area.
Where, however, a defendant acts deliberately or maliciously
to cause harm to a plaintiff with known sensitivities, those
actions may be judged unreasonable.8 In terms of a remedy an
injunction is available to refrain the wrongdoer from continuing
the nuisance. Where there is physical damage, damages will be
awarded and the measure of damages will be the cost of restoring
the land, or the diminution of the value of the land due to the
danage.8 Damage to crop as a result of a nuisance is recoverable,
as are the costs of averting a physical threat.8 Where however
a "transitory nuisance" causes the damage, diminution of land
value will not be the appropriate measure, as the value of the
land will seldom be reduced. Damages for loss of amenity value
are more appropriate in these circumstances and should only be
awarded for the period during which the nuisance persisted.86
Where there is no physical damage, reliance is placed upon
the interference with use and enjoyment of the land. This may be
reflected by damages for loss of utility or amenity value, although
an injunction is the more usual remedy. Damages for loss of profits
stemming from the inability to use land may also be recovered.8
Application to organicfarming
At first glance a claim, by an organic farmer, in nuisance
for contamination by spray drift looks promising. Where
contamination arises in excess of general tolerances, and a link
can be made to the wrongdoer, then recovery for loss suffered
is likely. Due to the fact that general tolerances are exceeded,
the issue of foreseeability is unlikely to arise. The fact that a
nuisance-creating farmer is busily engaged in feeding the nation
would not operate as a defence in favour ofthe farmer. Nor would
an argument of first in time. It will also be irrelevant that an
organic farmer could avoid the effects at a cost lower than that to
be paid by the non-organic farmer in eliminating the nuisance.
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The situation is less clear, however, where spray contamination
creates residues below the general level, but above organic
certification thresholds. The ability to claim for interference
with the use and enjoyment of land may assist the organic
farmer in this situation. It could be argued that the practices of a
defendant unduly restrict the ability of the plaintiff to operate an
organic farm and thus use and enjoy land in the manner of choice.
Damages could be sought for loss of utility as an organic farm.
The issue of foreseeability could be overcome in instances where
notice of presence of an organic farm had been given. The Court
would then have to assess what a reasonable level of interference
is.
In relying on the doctrine of nuisance the greatest obstacle
is that of abnormal sensitivity. The decision in Hawkes Bay
Protein v Davidson suggests that the interference or discomfort
need be substantial. This could be difficult to prove where
spray drift results in residual contamination, which exceeds the
organic, but not the general, standard. In assessing the degree
of interference a court would assess what is reasonable in the
immediate location. The constitution of the neighbourhood, and
spray practices employed would be relevant. The ease and extent
of the ability to control the discharge will be weighed as well.
Known vulnerabilitymay also be relevant. Where a neighbouring
operator has knowledge of a plaintiff's organic status and
possesses the ability to control spray practices, it is possible that
a court could find that operator to have acted unreasonably in
discharging spray in a manner that breached organic certification
standards. Although such actions could not be termed malicious,
they could be viewed as unnecessary. Toleration of sprays by
community and changing industry practice could influence a
court's decision in terms of reasonableness
Arguments from property rights may also bolster the organic
farmer as discussed previously. Consideration of the statutory
framework may be relevant and a court may also want to consider
rules in resource management plans created under the RMA,
relating to spray drift and land use when considering whether the
activity was reasonable. Planning permission will not necessarily
operate as a defence to a claim in nuisance. In identifying the
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balance to be struck between the parties a court will need toconclude whether or not the right to farm organically should besubordinated to the right of a neighbour to discharge chemicalsover the organic farmer's land in such a way as to result indecertification. Evolution of policy rejecting this latter position isarguably more consistent with international and national effortsto control the externalities of modern agriculture.81
A requirement to internalise effects causing decertification
represents one way in which a tolerable balance could be struck
between the parties. This would not mean that chemical farming
techniques could not be carried out on a block adjoining an
organic farm. It would simply mean that anyone applying those
chemicals should do so in a manner that does not have flow on
effects for incompatible activities. It may have implications for
some techniques, such as aerial crop dusting, but leaves open
other avenues. Finding sensible solutions that support all forms
of agriculture, without rendering one impossible should be the
goal for those administering the common law.
Rylands v Fletcher
Reliance upon the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher is another
avenue for recovery of damage to property. It is now established
that this doctrine is a subset of the nuisance action. The Court
of Appeal in Hamilton v Papakura District Council assessed the
similarities between the causes of action:8
The similarities between the Rylands v Fletcher cause of action and
the cause of action in nuisance are clear. Rylands v Fletcher deals
with an isolated instance of escape while nuisance is concerned
with a continuing wrong. The true nuisance should normally have
some degree of continuance about it as the plaintiff must show
some act of the defendant on his land that disturbs the actual or
prospective enjoyment of the plaintiff's rights over land. However,
an isolated escape can give rise to an action in nuisance. Examples
include a water main bursting Irvine & Co Ltd v Dunedin City
Corporation [1939] NZLR 741, a blocked drain causing a flood
Pemberton v Bright [1960 1 WLR 436 CA, and a gas explosion
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Midwood & Co Ltd v Mayor Aldermen And Citizens of Manchester
[1905] 2 KB 597. This illustrates the close relationship between the
law of nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher which originally
dealt with instances of the escape of large amounts of water stored
on the defendant's land, Lord Macmillan recognised in Read v J
Lyons and Co Ltd [1947] AC 156 that nuisance is a cogener of the rule
in Rylands v Fletcher, but the former usually focuses on the acts of
the defendant, while the latter always focuses on the event of an
escape of some mischievous thing which the defendant brought
onto his land,
The Court of Appeal also found that the requirement of
foreseeability was a prerequisite to both forms of action.9°
In Hamilton v Papakura District Council the requirement for
foreseeability was fatal to all three tort causes of action before
all three courts.
A differentiating factor of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is
the requirement that the activity carried out by the defendant
constituted a non-natural use of land. In Attorney-General v
Geothermal Produce NZ Ltd 91 the majority were not prepared to
classify the use of sprays in that case as non-natural, due to their
fairly common rural use in New Zealand and the state of English
case law. However Somers J, in minority, took a different view
and concluded:92
To direct a toxic hormone spray capable of drifting considerable
distances across the boundary of one's land up to heights of not less
than six feet hardly seems a natural use of land. I find it difficult
to see why the Department should not be liable under the rule in
Rylands v Fletcher.
In the Hamilton v Papakura District Council decisions neither
the Judicial Committee nor the Court of Appeal refer expressly
to the non-natural issue, instead there appears to be implicit
recognition that release of toxic sprays into a water supply could
constitute either cause of action, in the event thatthe requirement
for foreseeability is fulfilled. It may be that the better view is as
expressed by Professor Todd:93
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Aerial spraying of weedkillers near sensitive crops on nearby landprobably carries sufficient inherent risk of damage from drift toamount to a non-natural use even though it is a reasonably commonagricultural practice.
Accordingly there is potential for the organic farmer to recover
in nuisance, providing the issues of foreseeability and sensitivity
can be dealt with. What is reasonable in the circumstances
will come down to a court's decision in terms of the immediate
location.
Liability for damage caused by genetically modified organisms
Negligence
Physical damage
Whether contamination by GMO can constitute physical damage
raises the same issues discussed in relation to chemical drift. If
the contamination causes a change in the nature of the crop or
product it is possible that physical damage has occurred. Where
there is evidence of physical damage, a plaintiff will need to
prove that a duty of care was owed. In an instance where a crop
is known as likely to spread, foreseeability is unlikely to be an
issue. The duty may also include a requirement that the crop be
grown in such a way as not to cause harm.94
Statutory permission
The issue of statutory permission is relevant to both physical
damage and economic loss. The existence of a statutory
permission may impinge on whether or not a duty exists, as
courts may choose an approach that promotes consistency with
statute. In relation to GMO any statutory permission would
likely be issued under the Hazardous Substances and New
Organisms Act 1996 HSNOJ. The relationship between HSNO
and the common law has yet to be considered by the courts. In an
analogous situation permission granted under the RMA does not
prevent responsibility in tort.IS It is arguable that this approach
should be extended to cover permissions issues under HSNO.
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Permissions given under HSNO have similarities to resource
consents granted under the RMA. Initially HSNO was conceived
as part of the RMA. The permissions under each regime are
the result of a statutory framework where power is delegated
to another body to weigh the interests of the environment and
the interests of individuals in deciding how a resource is to be
used. Both systems adopt similar purpose clauses, and each
focus upon whether a particular activity should be permitted
and where necessary prescribe controls upon the exercise of the
permission. Administrative decisions under both HSNO and the
RMA may extinguish private rights without compensation, and
courts have therefore supported the need to retain access to tort
remedies regardless of the existence of a statutory permission.96
When considering the impact of a statutory permission upon
the common law, courts will examine the entire scheme of the
legislation. Whilst HSNO does not include a savings provision in
terms similar to that of s 23 of the RMA, it is clear that policy
makers have assumed that the common law will continue to
operate in tandem with statute.96 Section 124G of HSNO enables
recovery of damages for loss caused as a result of a breach of
the Act, but specifically preserves the right to seek additional
recovery by virtue of another cause of action.10° HSNO is silent
in terms of recovery for GMO damage caused in a situation
where there is no breach of the Act. If no common law remedy is
permitted for such a loss, the result will be that any loss will be
socialised, and this loss will fall on those who wish to produce
and trade as GMO-free. If, however, the common law provides
a remedy in negligence or nuisance irrespective of statutory
permission, it will be possible to recover unanticipated losses for
which there may be no other remedy.°1
If statutory permission did not prevent responsibility in
tort, it may yet provide an indicator relative to discharge of the
burden.°2 A defendant claiming to have "followed all the rules"
may receive some sympathy from the courts. This points to
the need for authorising agencies to understand coexistence
issues, and to have a detailed knowledge of the environment into
which the GMO will be released.103 Failure to comply with the
conditions of permission, such as a requirement for buffer zones
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or separation, is likely to constitute breach of duty, as well asrendering a defendant liable under the enforcement provisions
of a statutory scheme.
Threshold ofcontamination
In determining whether harm has been suffered, the courts will
have to decide whether a zero tolerance for GMO contamination
can sustain an action in negligence. This will depend upon what
a court considers reasonable in the circumstances. A pragmatic
court may choose to strike the balance at a level higher than the
zero tolerance level required for organic farming. On this basis
an organic farmer will be left without a remedy.
Compelling organic farms to accept a degree of contamination,
even where the contamination is minimal, removes the right
to choose how to farm. This loss of choice is a significant one,
and to be condoned must be justifiable. Those who support the
widespread use of GMO argue that contamination will need to be
accepted by the organic sector, and infer that a minimal degree of
contamination is appropriate due to the benefits to be provided
by GMO.104 However, before a court adopts this approach to the
level of harm, itwould need to examine closelybywhatmeasures
the harm could be avoided, the gravity of the risk, and the social
value of the activity. Such an enquiry would also want to consider
damage caused to non-organic growers who wish to remain GMO
free, and in doing so may want to consider increasing consumer
support for the purchase of GMO-free products.
Regardless of contamination levels, to succeed in negligence
it will be necessary to establish that a duty of care was owed
and that the loss was foreseeable. Relying on Perre v Apwid Pty
Ltd, factual conditions creating proximity, known vulnerability
and ability to avoid may lead to the establishment of a duty.
However, where there is potentially no other illegality arising in
relation to the defendant's conduct, a court may not be prepared
to interfere with the defendant's economic freedom in the
marketplace. The right of the defendant to use GMO will again be
juxtaposed against the right of the plaintiff to farm organically
and exclude unwanted intrusion. This exclusionary factor may
mean that an action in nuisance represents a better prospect
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for recovery Other policy issues such, as indeterminacy would
also require consideration. Widespread contamination by GMOs
could potentially render it impossible for any grower to be GMO
free. Potentially there could be a large class of persons seeking
redress in this situation, but not necessarily unascertainable. It
is arguable that reasonable determinacy will suffice in terms of
ascertainment. Although it should be noted that in relation to
the class action taken by organic farmers in Hoffman v Monsanto,
Smith J distinguished Perre v Apand Pty Ltd on the grounds that
the defendants would be exposed to "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class".
The class action also raised issues in relation to proximity and
foreseeability.
A final is sue is that of sensitivity A claim in negligence could be
defeated on this ground, however with GMO the class of potentially
sensitive activities, extends beyond the organic sector to include
all producers who wish to remain GE-free. In contrast to the single
class of hydroponic tomatoes in Hamilton v Papakura District
Council, this would appear to rather overreach the category of
sensitive. This issue will be reconsidered in respect of a claim in
nuisance, which is the subject of the next enquiry.
Nuisance
The issues for consideration are similar to those for spray
contamination. One potential difference is whether or not GMOs
can have the classification of dangerous applied in a manner
similar to the use of toxic sprays.105 To establish a claim in
private nuisance, a plaintiff as owner of land, must prove that
the defendant caused physical damage to the land or interfered
with the use and enjoyment of the land. Liability is strict,
however foreseeability is a prerequisite.b06 The focus will be on
the harm suffered by the plaintiff, but the defendant's conduct
will be considered in assessing whether the interference was
reasonable.107 The aim of the law will be to strike a balance
between the conflicting interests of neighbouring occupiers.b08
The character of the locality can be used to justify the activity
only in relation to inference with the use and enjoyment of land,




Damage to any GMO-free farmer will be foreseeable where notice
of that status is given to the GMO farmer.
Is the interference unreasonable?
Contamination by GMO, whether as physical damage or as
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land could
potentially found an action in nuisance. To be successful the
plaintiff would have to prove that the activity was unreasonable
in the circumstances.
Where an organic farmer has choice of operating an organic
farm eliminated by the presence of a contaminating GMO
neighbour, the use and enjoyment of the land as organic is clearly
interfered with. In an area where organic growing is predominant,
or at least well represented, a court may find thatthe interference
is unreasonable. While this may be beneficial for tightly grouped
organic growers, it does not necessarily represent a just principle
for decision-making. It in effect operates a principle of first in
time first in right. Such a principle may be initially beneficial to
established organic farmers. It may, however, eventually work
against the strengthening of the organic sector, as farmers
struggle to find appropriate soil types and climatic conditions in
an "organic/GE-free island".
Balancing interests and the issue ofsensitivity
The real issue that a court will have to deal will is again how to
strike a fair balance between competing interests in a situation
where one of those interests fails to internalise adverse effects
and the other is unwilling to accept them. A court will have
to consider whether or not the organic sector constitutes a
sensitive user. To come to this conclusion a careful assessment
of tolerance thresholds for organic and non-organic GMO-free
producers will have to be undertaken. If all GMO-free producers
adopted a similar standard, given the expanding market, it might
be difficult to argue that they are all sensitive. If, however, the
organic sector adopts a higher standard, a court favouring the
preservation of opportunities, could conceivably apply the label
of sensitivity and exclude liability on those grounds. From the
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organic sector's point of view such a move would destroy the
opportunity to be truly GM0-free.
It is arguable that classing organics as sensitive is inappropriate
in the circumstances. GMO technology is an outstanding example
of scientific innovation. Years of research and incalculable sums of
money have been invested in the technology. If science is capable of
such innovation, then it should also be able to provide technological
answers to avoid contamination. The evidence suggests that such
techniques are under development and will become available at
some time in the future.109 However in the haste to get GMO products
onto the market there seems to be something of a time lag between
production and response. If there is the possibility of applying
technology that could prevent contamination of organic farms, and
indeed of the wider environment, then those who come after us
would surely prefer to see opportunities for an uncontaminated
environment preserved. Although HSNO will provide relief where
a GMO farmer creates contamination in breach of conditions
imposed, in the absence of breach of condition, the common law
can potentially fill the gap. Where, in these latter circumstances, the
ground of sensitivity or any other prevents the operation of the
common law, no other remedy will exist and loss will be socialised.
This situation threatens the viability of organic, or any other GMO
free, production as currently conceived. A refusal to allow recovery
would need to be based on the premise that no one has a right to
choose to be GMO-free. Any such decision will provoke the need
for growers who wish to be GE free to utilise other measures such
as controlled spatial groupings of activities to remain free from
contamination. A more flexible approach to land use is one where
effects that cause decertification are internalised, and in that way
organic and non-organic growers remain compatible and retain
choice in terms of location. Application of the common law so as
to provide for internalisation of effects will also potentially be
consistent with the current approach to internalisation taken by
the courts under the RMA.
Rylands vFletcher
A separate argument could also be raised relying on the doctrine
of Rylands v Fletcher. One element, which sets the doctrine apart
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from nuisance, is the requirement that the defendant should be
making a non-natural use of land in carrying out the offending
activity. Whether or not the escape of GMO contaminating seeds
or pollen can be considered non-natural will depend upon the
court's assessment of the use of genetically modified plants in
farming.hbo The fact that the emanation is from a "natural" source
does not appear to be an obstacle. The escape ofthistle seeds from
a thistle infestation has grounded liability in nuisance.111Another
benefit of the doctrine is that liability applies whether or not
activities are authorised by a licence granted by statutory
regulators under environmental legislation.112
Conclusion
In New Zealand the common law has yet to be tested in relation
to contamination of an organic farm and consequent loss of
certification. Though the common law has been held out as
providing remedies that support the organic farm in the face of
pollution, a careful study reveals that clear protection extends
only so far as physical damage to a level compatible with general
damage. Even in that position, problems with causation are
possible. To receive the full protection of the common law, the
organic farmer needs to overcome the hurdles of foreseeability
sensitivity and statutorypermission and make an appeal to "reason"
for the purposes of survival. Factual conditions creating known
vulnerability and avoidability may potentially constitute sufficient
reason to overcome those hurdles and enable recovery. Courts
will be required to decide whether organic farms are entitled to
protection by the common law or obliged to defend themselves
by whatever means remaining. Reliance upon regulatory schemes
may offer an alternative option for preservation of integrity.
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